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NAIRA CONVERTIBILITY: THE JOURNEY SO FAR
BY
K. Tule'

Moses

of the regional

determined by this rate, but is not a
determinantof this rate, as in the case
of real exchange rates. lndeed, the
naira exchange rate is irrelevant in

table in ECOWAS and not likelY to be

are merelY
world
for
translating
rates
conversion
market prices into country foreign
trade currency prices so that the value
of the forergn trade naira is
#

foreign trade transactton as it does not

serve as a guide in making foreign
trade decisions. To be used this way,
the exchange rate would have to be a
price, which the naira exchange rate
is not.

{
Moses

K.

Tule

INTRODUCTION
Nigeria has increasingly been playing

a leading role in Afrtca, but not much
formal inter-regional trade has been
done in naira, although, appreciable
level of informal cross border trade

does exist, especially, in the
ECOWAS sub-region. However,
increased oil earnings, democracy,

economic growth, the introduction of
the euro and the need for the cfa to
have a new anchor different from the
French Treasury by 2009, the
establishment of the 2nd WestAfrican

Monetary Zone and its fast-track
programme of monetary integration,
the ECOWAS trade liberalization

scheme, etc. have triggered

speculations about a convertible naira
or a much bigger international role for
the naira (the object of these great
expectations not withstanding, at the
moment, naira balances are not
automatically transferable even within
ECOWAS).

The conduct of intra-ECOWAS trade

has not changed despite Nigeria's
clear economic dominance in the
region as much of the trade in
ECOWAS is in primary products and

with non-regional members. Thus,
the commercial exchange rate of the
naira as well as the exchange rates
assigned to the currencies of other

Protocols on trade
liberalization. The perennial problems
remain the primary nature of exports,
multi-lateralism and the negative
terms of trade, with the latter being a
price centric problem. At the moment,

ECOWAS countries

Since the ECOWAS countries began

their mutual attempt for a regional
currency, to clear trade, there has
been renewed hope that a regional
currency might become eventually
realizable and the envisaged
currency might even serve as an

all three issues are not seriously on the

in the near future as the region
remains principally, a price taker.

At the moment, ECOWAS countries
denominate their exports in the US
dollar. However, the absence of real
exchange rate in the cfa or naira for
instance, implies that revaluation or
domestic exchange rate policies alone
may not change the fortunes of any of

the region's currencies. The lack of
real exchange rates in foreign trade is
merely one symptom of the necessity
to insulate ECOWAS economies from
disruptive economic forces.

international currency, at least, within
the sub-region. Since 1999 when this

thinking gained momentum (being

However, what is needed urgently is
an economic mechanism that would

spearheaded by Nigeria and Ghana),

directly link the structure of production

and with at least four deadlines for
commencement of the new currency
having passed and no noticeable
improvement, the conclusion is that
no regional currency is feasible in
ECOWAS beside the cfa, at least, in
the near future. Consequently, most

with foreign trade contract prices
within ECOWAS. Presently, the

countries in ECOWAS, especially, the
WAMZ countries have been making
frantic efforts towards positioning their

country currencies for better

bargaining in the event of a regional
monetary union. As for the cfa, it is
not automatically transferable within
the whole of ECOWAS, the feather
weight of the francophone countries'

economies, being principally

responsible for making the cfa, a very
weak currency.
Within ECOWAS, while each member
country, especially of the WAMZ has
attempted to guide and develop own
trade with tools of greater or less
sophistication, they have made little
individual efforts at improving intraregional trade aside from the signing

existing currency rates do not form a
connecting link between the internal
prices of the ECOWAS countries and
the foreign trade prices to the extent
needed by ECOWAS foreign trade. lf
such a mechanism was introduced,
improvement of exchange rates
(which if used to judge trade at
present)would give a false impression
of the effectiveness of trade in certain
goods is seen as one of the conditions
for improved trade.

This vacuum and slow pace of the
ECOWAS wide programme on
monetary integration may have
informed the resolve of the nonUEMOA members of ECOWAS to
launch a fast track programme on
monetary integration in 1999 to
achieve a monetary union outside
UEMOA for later discussions with the
cfa zone. However, four deadlines
have passed and progress has been
rather slow, howbeit, some institutions
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have been established to midwife the

process. Another deadline

of

December 2009 is fast approaching
and the realisation of the integration

programme looks quite bleak.

Sensing possible failure, individual
WAMZ members have been making

efforts towards positioning

themselves. Thus, two of its most
important members (Nigeria and
Ghana) have been pursuing policies
that seek to strategically position their
individual currencies in a position of

countries) such as bonds in naira by

other countries, pricing of
commodities (such as gold, oil,
agricultural produce) in global
markets

in naira, and maintaining

international reserves

of

other

countries (not just ours) in naira.

Thus, when a currency could be
converted, exchanged, transferred,
purchased, acquired or disposed of
for other currencies, in any legal

redenomination exercise in July 2007

transaction, that currency is said to be
convertible. Currency convertibility
imply acceptance of the obligations of
Article Vlll, Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the

and Nigeria's attempt to denominate
and accede toArticle lV under the IMF
Articles of Agreement, which implies

Theoretically, convertible currencies

strength for future negotiations. This

may have informed Ghana's

full current account liberalization.

Articles of Agreement of the
lnternational Monetary Fund (lMF).

are regarded as reserve

or

international currencies.
This paper examines the path to Naira
Convertibility, the Journey so far. lt
avers that convertibility is pursued by
countries either as an economic
management approach or as a toolfor
achieving higher reckoning on the

global economic stage.

Consequently, the examples of
Argentina, Chile, Peru, Brazil, etc

A currency could either be fully or
partially convertible, internally or
externally convertible. A fully
convertible currency involves a
situation where a currency is a clean

float, exchanged unconditionally at
the market exchange rate without
undue interference in achieving a

or

could fall in the first category while the

particular exchange rate

Russian Rubble push could qualify for
the second group. Nigeria's efforts at
Naira convertibility would fall in the
second category, where the country
seeks to position itself in realization of
its Financial System Strategy 2020 in
which the country aims at being one of
the twenty largest economies by the

particular goal with the currency. lt

year 2020. Following this
introduction, the Theory and
Evidence

for Naira Convertibility

is

presented in Section ll, while Section
lll examined the Synthesis of the

Naira Convertibility

Programme.

involves removal

of

controls

a

on

current and capital accounts of the
balance of payments, absence of
exchange control and documentation
for foreign exchange procurement as
well as the opening up of the currency
to speculation.

Partial convertibility on the other
hand, involves the existence of a
managed float foreign exchange

market that allows limited and
documented access to the stock of

paper.

foreign exchange within approved
scope of activities permitted by the
foreign exchange guidelines.
Consequently, it entails limited

II.

removal of restrictions on the current
account.

Section lV examines the lssues in

Naira Convertibility. Section V
summarizes and concludes the
THEORY AND EVIDENCE
FORNAIRA
CONVERTIBILITY

Naira convertibility involves the

dollarization, euroization or

substitution

of

naira assets

and
liabilities and the internationalization
of the naira. This is also referred to as
full CapitalAccount Convertibility. lt
in_volves the invoicing of a proportion

of world trade in the

naira,

denomination of internationai
financial instruments (by otner

External convertibility is a situation
where all holdings of a country's
currency by non-residents are freely
exchangeable into any foreign (nonresident) currency at exchange rates

within the official margins.
Consequently, all payments that the
residents of the country ate

authorized to make to non-reiidents

may be made in any externally
convertible currency
that th;
residents can buy in - the foCIjn
4

exchange market. lnternal

convertibility on the other hand,
entails the absence of restrictions on
the ability of residents of a country to

use their holdings

to

of

domestic

acquire any foreign
currency to hold or transfer to any

currency

non-resident for any purpose. While
external convertibility is only partial
convertibility, full convertibility entails
the sum of both internal and external
convertibility.

Different levels of convertibility are
identifiable in the literature. Thus, we

make the distinction between
regional and global convertibility.

Whereas the former conveys the right
to convert the domestic currency into
currencies of specific countries in the
region, the latter allows the holder of

the domestic currency to convert it
into any currency of choice. ln
addition, we differentiate on the basis
of transactions demand for foreign
exchange i.e. the purpose for which
foreign exchange is sought. Thus, we
distinguish between current and
capital account convertibility.

The current account includes the
value of trade in merchandise,
services, investment, income and
unilateral transfers. Current account
convertibility conveys the right to
convert domestic currency into
foreign exchange for the purpose of
making offshore payments for goods

and services. There are three
approaches to current account
convertibility: pre-announcement, by-

product, and front-loading
approaches. Each approach is
distinguished by the importance it
attaches to convertibility relative to
other economic objectives.

The capital account involves

in financial assets.
Capital account convertibility entails
the limited conversion of domestic
currency into foreign exchange for
payments in respect of capital
transfers and transactions. This also
implies the freedom to convert local
transactions

financial assets into foreign assets in
any form and vice versa at marketdetermined rates of interest. Capital
controls restrict or prohibit offshore
movement of capital. Such controls
include; need for prior approval,

authorization and notification,
multiple currency practices,

discriminatory taxes, and
reserv;
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requirement

or

interest penalties

!II.

imposed by the authorities.

SYNTHESIS OF THE NAIRA

CONVER.TIBILITY
PROGRAMME

Nalfa convertiDilitY, therefore,
involves a Naira-bas ed commoditY

trading sYStem where Nigeria's
princ.ipbl exports: crude oil, palm oil,

gold, cocoa, cassava, soYa beans,
grains, etc, would be traded in Naira,
creating in the process, a euro, dollar,
yen, sterling, etc demand forthe Naira
in Nigeria. The Malaysian palm-oil
ringit, crude oil-ringit, Russian grain
ruble, crude oil-ruble and gold-ruble
are classic examples of domestic

The idea of a convertible Naira has
been long in the making following the

attainment of political independence

in 1960.

However,

the

imPort

substituting industrialization strategy

at independence, which was meant to
position the country on the path to self
reliance was not export oriented and

so, the external sector relied mainly
on the export of primary agricultural

commodities, whose values

currency convertibilitY. This

fluctuated widely. The emerging new

arrangement enables the attainment
of inward-looking full convertibility for
the domestic currency. A workable
convertibility programme involves a

economic and political problems of
enormous dimension leading to a 30
month civil war in which most of the

gradual reduction in the stock of public
domestic debt to achieve an interest

free domestic currency capable of
stimulating groMh and commanding
international acceptability.

A convertible currency

encourages
currency substitution in favor of that

currency. However, de facto

euroization, dollarization or
nairaization results from individuals

voluntarily choosing to use foreign
currency as either a transaction
substitute or as a store of value
substitute (asset substitution) for the
monetary services of the domestic
currency. This calls for increased
output by the country seeking to make
its currency convertible and ensuring

economy was confronted with

country's infrastructure in the eastern
axis of the country, the amphitheatre
of thewar, was destroyed.

The post war reconciliation efforts
opened avenues for huge inflow of
foreign investment. However, the
accompanying oil boom and reverse

policy of indigenization of foreign
owned enterprises in 1977 (the
enabling Decree, the Nigerian
'Enterprises Promotion Decree
(1977) barred foreigners from
participating in certain sectors of the

economy and limited their
participation in others to between 4060 percent, depending on the sector),

was counter productive to the flow of
direct foreign investment. The Decree

which aimed at promoting domestic

of prices to make the
proved an anti-climax as
domestic currency a stable asset enterprises,
it
encouraged
huge disinvestment
premise
is that a
substitute. The
stability

successful convertible cunency is one
which is reliable and expected to
retain its value sufficiently over time as
a substitute asset (or store of value).

from the country as substantial
controls were introduced to curb

foreign exchange transactions. The
Austerity Measures of 1981, designed

as a

macroeconomic stimulating
package increased controls, further

Currency substitution means the use
of a foreign currency in the domestic

weakening the prospects for naira

economy instead of the local currency.
There has been widespread currency
substitution in Nigeria with some
vendors who offer services in the

The Structural Adjustment

domestic economy preferring

to be

paid in foreign currency instead of the
naira. Currency substitution takes
place when the public perceive that

the local currency has failed

to

perform its role as a store of value, a

unit of account and as a medium of
exchange. Currency substitution has
implications for tax revenue as well as

monetary and foreign exchange
policies of the country.

convertibility.

Programme (SAP) of 1986, however,

represented the first major step in

easing capital controls, post
independence. Following the
adoption of the lnternatronal
Monetary Fund (lMF) sponsored SAP,

fundamental steps were taken
towards liberalization of the financial
system in 1987 with the removal of

most controls, includrng the
introduction of a more tiberal foreign

exchange market
5

as well as

the

introduction of bureaux-de-change for

across the counter transactions in
foreign exchange for limited amounts.

ln addition to these,

Policies

encouraging the flow of foreign direct
investment into Nigeria as opposed to
the more volatile portfolio flows were
introduced.

Over the years following the misguided indigenization programme'
government established several
institutions, designed to Promote
foreign investment and the inflow of
foreign capital, generally. Thus, the
lndustrial Development Coordinating
Committee

(1

988), Nigeria lnvestment

promotion Commission (1995),
Foreign Exchange Monitoring Decree

of Nigeria
Export lmport Bank, Calabar ExPort

(1995), establishment

Processing Zone, ExPort
Development Fund, Export Expansion

Grant Scheme, formed Part of the
enabling environment created for
promoting capitalflows. ln addition to
these, a plethora of tax incentives and
concessions were given to foreign
investors in the Annual Monetary and

Foreign Exchange Guidelines of the
CBN.

The emerging trend of globalization
following the end of the cold war,
created high appetite for the
movement of global finance asoss
frontiers to locations where conditions
were most favourable. The emerging

economies of Eastern Europe
provided a more fertile environment
for the attraction of westem capital
than most regions. Elsewhere, most

countries tried to play the beautiful
bride by reducing or eliminating

erstwhile barriers to free trade through
trade and capital account !iberalization

and reforming the foreign exchange
markets, as signals of commitment to
sound macroeconomic policies. The
fear, however, was that improper
sequencing of the liberalization of the
current account and intervening

circumstances increased the
possibility of sudden capital reversals
as in Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Brazil,
etc. and a resort to a regime of fixed
exchange rates. These fears were

premised on the grounds that
economies with weak banking
systems and no previous experience
with trade liberalization are acutely
exposed to the vagaries of attack on
the international financial system in
the event of crises.

Volume 34, No. 2
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in

Nigeria,

experimented, each allowing limited
convertibility. However, following the

reforms

rapid economic development".

a

number of foreign exchange
management regimes were

of the foreign exchange

market in March 2006, a Wholesale

Dutch Auction System (wDAS)
replaced the retail Dutch Auction
System of foreign exchange trading.
As part of the reforms, the foreign

exchange market was substantially
liberalized while foreign investors
were en@uraged to invest in all
segments of the economy, including
Nigerian Treasury Bills, Federal
Govemmentof Nigeria Bonds, aswell
as in the equities sectors, with the
proviso that such investment was to
remain domiciled in the country for at
least one year before repatriations of

any kind could be made.

The
provisions were intended to check the
inflow of hot capital which was not
intended to benefitthe economy.

A

more dramatic attempt towards
Naira convertibility was made on

August 14,2OO7, when the Governor
of the Central bank, Prof. Chukwuma

Soludo reeled out a programme
tagged 'Strategic Agenda for the
Naira' in Phase Two of the reform
agenda, Phase One having being
launched three years eadier.

The Strategic Agenda for Naira was
anchored on the Central Bank of
Nigeria Act, 2007 (Section 2) which
outlines the key objectives of the Bank
include inter alia: (a) ensure
monetary and price stability; (b) issue

to

legal tender currency in Nigeria; (c)
maintain external reserves to
safeguard the international value of
the legaltender currency; (d) promote
a sound financial system in Nigeria;

The elements of the programme
involved a restructuring of the
domestic currency through

redenomination by dropping two
zeros with a view to restoring the
value of the Naira (in the short term)to
its 1985 value, anchoring inflationary

expectations, strengthening public
confidence in the Naira, ease of
conversion to other currencies,
reversing the tendency for currency
substitution, eliminating higher
denomination notes, reduction in
currency production costs, promoting

a coins

usage culture thereby

achieving more efficient pricing and

payments system; and laying the
foundation for Naira convertibility and
thus positioning it as the reference
currency. The need to thus position
the Naira as an African Reference
currency was given greater push by
the African Union's concession of the
Headquarters of the African Central
Bank to Nigeria, making it incumbent
on the country to provide responsible

leadership in terms of properly
aligning its currency structure with
international best practice and sound
monetary policy.

Complementary measures outlined in

the Strategic Agenda for the Naira
included the adoption of inflation
targeting framework of monetary
management by the Central Bank of

Nigeria, sharing of Federation
Accounts in US dollars, a move
designed to deepen the foreign
exchange market as well as improve

liquidity management, and

liberalization of the current account
i.e. current account convertibility
implying accession to Article Vlll of
the lMF. Full current account
iberalization/convertibility means that

and (e) act as banker and provide

I

economic and financial advice to the

Nigeria would eliminate all restrictions

Federal Government.

on current account transactions while
accession to Article Vlll implies that
the policy is not easily reversible.

As indicated bythe CBN Governor, by
focusing on the Naira in the Phase
Two of the reform agenda, the Bank

The Naira convertibility programme

desired to give greater emphasis to

embellished in the Strategic Agenda

the most important function of central

for the Naira poised to create a sound

banks everywhere

in the world

namely, to issue legal tender currency
and to defend its value. Thus, Phase

Two was to "make the Naira the
currency of reference in Africa, and
thus a strategic catalyst for achieving
the goal of an international financial
centre as wellas promoting Nigeria's

currency with the attributes of the
naira being a satisfactory store of
value, medium of exchange, and a
unit of account addressed headlong
some critical issues to effective
monetary management, including
arresting the penchant for fiscal
dominance and excessive borrowing
6

by government from the CBN (to be
addressed through inflation targeting)
and the possibility of the Naira
emerging as a dominant currency by
December 2009 (in tine with the
ECOWAS Programme of Monetary
lntegration).
The goal of these policies was to push

further, the drive towards a single
currency in West Africa with greater
vigor. With a control of 70 per cent of
ECOWAS economy and control of 80
per cent of its reserves, a properly
aligned naira is intended to serve as a
reference currency; the realization of
the dream of a regional monetary
union would become more credible
and realistic.

The implementation of the strategic
agenda for the naira became a
subject of much media bliss and
subsequently, suspended by
government. Although a number of
countries have acceded toArticle Vlll
of IMF Articles of Agreement, not all
IMF members have approved capital

account liberalization. For instance,

China, lndia and Russia have had

several debates on the matter

domestically but none of them has

taken a definite step yet.
Consequently, as the wind of
globalization intensify, the trend
towards convertibility is becoming
more prominent and would continue

to attract the attention of

several

countries.
The attempt to influence foreign trade
efficrency and promote the use of a
dominant regional currency, however,
has not served to transmit the internal

prices of ECOWAS countries
outward, and hence, have not had
any appreciable impact on regional

trade pricing. At the moment,
although very desirable, intraECOWAS trade is not quoted in any of

the regional currencies but in

US

dollar or euro. A programme of naira

converlibility would begin by the
dominant economic power in the
region, Nigerra, demanding that
regional members settle trade with
her in naira. Thus, Nigeria would
have to put up efforts at ensuring that
the regional naira trade connects the

of the national
economy with that of the ECOWAS
value formation

trading partners and that the
transferable naira comes into
existence by passing from the internal

2$1$
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o(
money circu\ation \nto the sPhere At
i"i.rsiate clearing arrangements' the
ine moment, even Nigeria and

other ECOWAS members when it

comes to trade, think in dollar terms'
butthe dotlar price is iust another price
quoted atthe naira conversion rate.

IV. TSSUES IN NA!RA

The argument
flexible exchange rate
inflows,
cap(al
h\gher
w'tth
here IS that
the local currency would appreciate

whi\e retur NS on tuture inflows
decline thus arresti ng fu rther capital
inflows before a crises point The
policy implication of this argument is
that capital account convertibitity is

more compatible with flexible

CONVERTIBILITY

exchange rate regimes because a
fixed exchange rate system like

It is important to note that it is the joint

Bretton Woods would easily

of trade restrictions and
exchange controls on current account
transactions that determine how fully
product

breakdown under increased capital

mobility. However, flexible exchange

rate regimes do not insulate the
flnancial system from the risk of
currency and banking crises as an
appreciating real exchange rate

a

country's goods markets are
integrated into the world economy.
However, the substance of current

harms the country's e-xternal
competitiveness, thus affecting

groMh. Stock prices are about

th6

most volatile of prices and these
volatilities occur in adjudged safe

flexible markets.

direction and ease

of

currencY

convertibility. A country considered to
be politically unstable may not provide

attraction for other countdes to dealin
its currency or its exchange rate in the
market would yield an undesirable
exchange rate. However, when there
is a change in govemment considered

to be favored by other @unties,

trading in the cunency of that country
is considerably enhanced.

From the social viewpoint, trade wtth
considered
undesirable, and serves as basis for
making it more difficult to convert the

the country may be

currency involved. Environmental
factors or natural disasters may

decrease the desirability to trade th6

currency.issued by that country. This
may result in an undesirable exchange

Flexib le exchange rates do not ru
le
out banking cn ses which res ult from
rate or a clear refusal to mae de
cap ita mobil ity. This is especially
SO
currency
issued by that county for
w h e re h e b a n k n g S e c o r
other currencies.
u n efa b e
The Ja pa nese
e x p e ri e n ce p rov d es a c
SS c
V.
SUMMARY AND
exa mple tn th IS regardI as the banking
CONCLUSION
crises n that cou ntry was thought
to
h ave bee n
The paper traced the evolution of
n g g ered b v cap ita
naina
mobility. Japa n h ad tn the la te
c
o n VE rt b
9 70s
v n N g e f a from
an d ea rlY 980s provided nefficient
nd e p e n d e n c e o prese n t
d ay
g u a ra n e S
situating in the process, efiorts
o Wea k ba n k n
v
of
nstitution S a nC fi rm S throug h 'cash
Moa
f t h e b e n e fi S c t f u
mo neta ry u nification ln the ECOWAS
flow rnsurance' U nder an a rran g
converti bi lity ca n be rea ped through
SU b-reg ion
It showed that divergent
e ment
pa rtial converti bi lity S uch
of
complex
regulation
nterests being pursued by both
S
that
AS equ itv
a llowed
blocks
the ban ks to function as a ca rtel
and direct foreign nvestm nt.
in E COWAS (i. e. the UEMOA
This ts
Th e
and
the
gu a fa ntees soug ht to
beca use wh ile free trade h
wAMZ), have frustrated efiorts
en ble the
AS been
at
benefiting in stitu tions to stay
sh own to genera te n
pursu ing a realistic programme
po sitive
afloat,
of
be nefits, evidence of similar
but placed the bu rden for
m onetary un ification tn the
gains
such
zone.
g uarantees on the more
fro m free capital mobi lity has
profita
S imply
bt
n ot been p rovided (B hagwati,
fi rms. with ibera ization in
The failure of the region_wide
the 980s,
1 998
efiorts
)
W h it e fu lt convertib it itv
the e rstwhi le big p rofltable
in the erErg"n""-;i -il;
ma v be
banks
Ig:ytlgd
d esirable countries are
defected n a big way to
y AM? sptinter group wilnin ECOWA5
not tn a hurry
th e uroto embrace it beca use it bri
dol
la
ma
rket,
leavi
spearheaded
ng
the
ngs with it
d mestic
by Nigeria and Ghana
th e twin prob lems one tn the
ban ks with less profitabte
wntch galvanized the
curren cy
firms AS
non_
market and the other tn the
thei only borrowers. The
francophone ECOWAS memOers
ban kin g
big banks
sector. For insta nce, China
later tu rn ed to rea estate and
pursue a fast_track approach io
despite its
the rest
to
strong globat economi c performan
o f A s a fo
monetary unification.' S.rerrl
mo e p ot a b e
CE,
d oes not have curre nt
nvestments
thus creating e normou S
deadlines have passed and ."rfs
or capita
acco unt S ustaina b ility, but rema
crises for the ba nki ng system
nave been ratherslow.
NS an
Th e
investor's ha ven attracting
mplicati, o n ts that a sound
h rg h rate
banki ng
of retu rn on nvestment. G iven
S v s em
S
nS umen a
slow pace of the fast_track
to fu
the
current global fi nancial crises
converti b lity to avert a cu rren
ap.proach and its missed Oeadtines
rh e cost
cy and
of converti bi lity wo uld ndeed
ba nki ng crises The experien
ha VE
ces of to individuat countries cjer"l.pmJirIi,
bee n very high for c hina.
countries SU ch a s Ma la ysia
own approaches at straieq'icailv
( 994
.
Spain
I

Ih"

However, it may be argued that
crises

couro be avoided

by adopting a

II

I e2)

Brazil

(

994 ), C hi le

ndicate that convertibility is a
one way street, th e re ts no reverse
1

gear.

7

iJ

positioning themsetves foi"Oettl?

bargaining power in a future

m"n;t ;
on. Having successfullv
redenominated amidst a highli
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devalued cedi, Ghana was soon
followed by Nigeria which not only
announced a redenomination but also

The paper suggested that Nigeria
should initiate a more realistic naira
convertibility programme through

stopped by govemment fi at.

trade guarantees where it insists that
imports from Nigeria from member
ECOWAS members would have to be
paid for in naira rather than any other

accompanied it with a timetable
towards naira convertibility. The
Nigerian programme was however

currency. This approach, it

is

thought, would engender the growth
of naira consciousness in the subregion and make the naira a dominant

currency in the region.
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